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Changes of Emphases : Greek
Christendom, Westernization, South-
Eastern Europe, and Neo-Mitteleuropa
Andrei Pippidi
1 « The composition of a provincial history is only a legitimate undertaking if the province
in question has formed down the ages a coherent social entity, distinct from and even
hostile to its neighbours, enclosed within more or less stable frontiers, and conscious in
some fashion of its unity. »1 In these words, Marc Bloch intended to delineate the matter
on which he focused his research. Accordingly, we are going to see if we can agree on
considering the Balkans a province of Europe.
2 Seeing, as I do now, the title I announced for this conclave of scholars dealing with the
Balkan area, I am shocked at my own temerity. Particularly so in that I appear to be
bringing owls to the goddess Athena, or, as we say in Romania, coxcombs to the gardener.
My hope is to show how some stages in the historical development of this region coincide
with definitions, old and new, of South-Eastern Europe. One can choose to emphasize the
existing contrasts in the region, or one can allow them only secondary importance and
retain instead the homogeneity of mores and institutions.
 
The Balkan disunity vs. the homo-balkanicus
3 The former viewpoint is well illustrated by some remarks made on the subject, 60 years
ago, by a one-time expert on Central and Eastern Europe whose studies can still be found
in  the  bibliography  of  U.S.  foreign  relations,  Joseph  S.  Roucek2.  In  1939,  when  he
explained that the foreseeable satellization of Balkan countries by Hitler’s Germany was
driven by the ebb of democracy in their internal organization, Roucek signalled also that
« the grouping of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Roumania and Yugoslavia under the common
term Balkan is in a sense artificial, because the five states do not form a cultural or an
Changes of Emphases : Greek Christendom, Westernization, South-Eastern Europe...
Balkanologie, Vol. III, n°2 | 2008
1
economic unit ». And he added : « up to our day, the Balkans have remained a striking
example of disunity - geographic, ethnical, linguistic, religious, cultural and political »3.
4 Another professor at Columbia, but one of the previous generation, William M. Sloane,
admitted  that  « the  Balkan  Peninsula »  was  a  « loose »  designation,  but  found  it
« historically very useful »4. Two themes which were later to influence Roucek’s vision
might already be discerned in these reflections dating back to 1914. On the eve of another
world war, Sloane noted the social and political backwardness of the region, which he
attributed to the « the early patriarchal state », and, when describing Bucharest as a city
of strong contrasts - an image which we can still recognize - Sloane concluded that it was
« a microcosm of the country as a whole ;  at  first  sight unorganized,  disconnected,  a
mechanical mixture of unrelated parts ». Ab uno disce omnes : Bucharest being taken as a
paradigm of Romania, that country offered likewise a model for the totalizing treatment
of the Balkans.
5 The rigid framework of such clichés continues to impede the efforts of modern explorers
to  understand the  Balkan reality.  Nevertheless,  assessments  like  those  of  the  above-
mentioned  American  academic  travellers  were  right  to  note  a  retarded  rhythm  of
development. Had they crossed Europe one century earlier, they would have found the
same variety of states, languages and confessions of faith everywhere going east from
France : the Kleinstaaterei was still flourishing in Germany and Italy till 1848 or even until
the ‘60s and ‘70s of  the 19th century.  Looking at  the complex tapestry of  the Balkan
region,  Roucek  was  impressed  by  « scores  of  tongues,  dialects  and religions »,  while
Sloane  felt  like  being  a  visitor  in  an  « ethnological  museum ».  Actually,  the  map of
language areas from Hungary’s Eastern border to Istanbul does not show more than nine
languages (15 dialects). The religious distribution includes ten traditional confessions of
faith, representing the three main religions5. We could compare this not only with the
unprecedented and still-growing number of Churches and sects in the U.S. today, but also
with  the  historical  situation  in  Central  Europe,  where  both  before  and  after  the
Reformation the tendency for religious identity to be added to ethnic difference was by
no means unknown. So, after all, what was perceived by foreigners as a patchwork, in
political and ethnic terms, was the exaggerated reflex of a situation that could have been
met more westwards at an earlier stage. The judgement passed by such descriptions of
the Balkan peninsula might also be influenced by two other factors : the migrations called
by Cvijić « metanastatic movements » - which, in many cases, were mass deportations
ordered by the Ottoman administration, or some exodus of a fugitive population (Bežanija
,  bejenie)  -  and the pattern set by nationalistic-minded scholars who, in every Balkan
country, tried to present their own civilisation as the oldest, downgrading the others.
Last but not least, our libraries contain quite a few pamphlets under frightening titles,
like Atrocités bulgares en Macédoine, Atrocités grecques en Macédoine, Bulgarian Atrocities, or
The Balkan Massacres : A Turkish Appeal6. That stream of horror journalism was produced by
the wars which, in 1912-1913, led to certain adjustments being made to the borders of the
first succession states detached from the Ottoman Empire. But in our own day we are
witnesses of a second, no less violent, succession crisis, and as a result the stereotype of
Balkan multiplicity tends to be reiterated or confirmed.
6 However, like in the old Greek myth, variance of form does not necessarily mean every
time a new content. Maybe, we should listen more carefully to the opposite version, in
favour of the unitary perspective. The Balkans are what they are because, during their
long and dramatic  history,  they were a dead end for successive invasions which left
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alluvial strata by mixing with the surviving native population. The same thing happened
in the two other European peninsulas : for the most Western of them, the last invaders
were the Arabs ;  Italy,  after  centuries  of  servitude and many barbarian assaults,  was
thoroughly swept by the Spaniards (the Austrian rule, the last to be established, should
properly by considered a military occupation). In South-Eastern Europe, the retreat of the
Turks did not mean a major demographic change before the 19th and 20th centuries, Of the
peoples who had preceded them,  the Slavs and the Bulgars,  the Hungarians and the
Germans (Saxons), as well as the Gypsies7, settled down and in the meantime the large
Romanized core of the Balkan population was constantly diminished, being assimilated.
Archaeologists and ethnographers refer to a folk culture, presumably of neolithic origin,
and they draw our attention, rightly or wrongly, to the ancient Thracians and Illyrians,
mythic ancestors of the Balkan races. An exhibition at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts,
showing the results of archaeological excavation in Bulgaria, presented recently several
beautiful examples of gold jewellery of the 5th century B.C. , an art of which analogous
vestiges could easily have been found on the Northern bank of the Danube.
7 The claims of ethnologists and especially those of anthropogeographers - of a school once
brilliantly  represented by Cvijić and Ancel 8 -  are less  convincing.  From the study of
economic  and  technological  data,  of  traditional  dress  and  popular  beliefs,  of  space
perception and distribution, or of kinship relations, some specialists have asserted the
existence of a homo balcanicus. What is questionable in this perhaps too sanguine opinion
is the interpretation of a complex set of circumstances as relevant for, or unique to, our
particular civilization area, though similar situations may be discovered in completely
different societies that find themselves in the same stage of development. For instance,
the fictitious genealogies which accounted for the land distribution in the traditional
village community of Wallachia and Moldavia have been identified by the anthropologist
Jack Goody during his fieldwork in Ghana9.
8 On the other hand, the view, largely shared in the West, about the Balkan wars, including
the recent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, has been that they were an outbreak of ancient
and  violent  hatreds  among  the  local  populations,  but  this  line  of  interpretation  is
essentially false10. For most of their history, the Slavic peoples of the region have lived
mixed together, without a clear-cut division, for instance, between Bulgarians and Serbs.
The absence of an ethnic identification was still evident in 1848 from the answer given by
the peasants of Himara (a zone presently mapped on the Albanian coast), when Edward
Lear asked them what they were : “Christians” was their first reply, then “Himariots”
(the actual designation, according to our knowledge, would probably have been Vlachs)11.
The religious specificity was the only one deeply ingrained, as it had been accepted and
encouraged by the Turks, who invented the collective identity system of the “millet”, a
community  based  on  shared  adherence  to  a  non-Moslem faith.  During  the  Ottoman
period, terms like “Bulgarian” or “Greek” were not used to refer to ethnic or national
groups :  they  designated  sociocultural  categories,  or,  if  you  wish,  estates,  mostly
associated  with  one  language :  “Greek”  for  a  merchant,  “Vlach”  for  a  shepherd and
“Bulgarian” for a farmer or market gardener12. When the language distinction was not
considerable,  the  differentiation  was  imposed  from  above  either  by  the  political
authority, or by the spread of literacy, which was instrumental in developing the sense of
national identity. Literacy was not something innocent, acquired for pure pleasure, but
was part of the drill imparted by the modern liberal state.
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9 Thus, even in this representation of the Balkans as a historical and cultural unit, we find
two lines of argument : one, which gives it the dimensions of a primordial fact, and the
second, which concludes that this unity is the product of special geopolitical conditions
(above all,  the successive foreign rules :  first,  that of  the Roman Empire,  then of the
Byzantine state, followed by the “Tourkokratia”). This last interpretation, pointing out
the  remnant  conditions  which  have brought  coherence  to  the  region,  has  a  further
variant,  overcharged with emotionalism,  which emphasizes  the role  of  the Orthodox
Church as having protected the Christian people under Turkish domination from any
alien influence. However, this assumption fails to explain why the Bulgarians and Serbs
were capable of mutual ferocity, no less than were the Serbs and Croats when they were
fighting each other without having in common the same religious creed.
10 Huntington’s notorious theory has, on the contrary, turned the division between Catholic
and Orthodox into a major and general conflict, one for which it is impossible to achieve
concilation. But not only does the association of Orthodox and Moslem contradict both
the logic of the demonstration and the historical tradition ; what is more questionable in
this new partition of Europe is the integration of the Baltic countries into the Western
pattern.  They  are  obviously  Northern,  neither  Western,  nor  Eastern,  and  only  their
annexation  by  Russia  made  them  a  part  of  Eastern  Europe  since  the  18th century ;
otherwise, they would have claimed their independence from Sweden, and would have
got it more easily. Another strong objection is that the borderline between the Habsburg
and the Ottoman Empires did not acquire its importance because of its religious function,
but as a result of the imperial policies aimed at building up military bulwarks, and more
especially as a consequence of different rates of cultural evolution. The fierce opposition
of the Orthodox clergy to Catholicism should not be treated as a fatal hostility, of the
“cats and dogs” type. Catholicism being hierarchic and heavily disciplinarian, the village
priests,  who  were  elected  by  their  flock,  struggled  for  their  autonomy,  as  did  the
monastic  houses :  it  was  therefore  a  rural  solidarity  movement  from  below  which
cemented Orthodox conservatism.
11 Two more recent  interventions in the debate deserve particular  attention.  For  Larry
Wolff, “Eastern Europe” is an invention of the Western Enlightenment. The separation of
Europe into spheres of domination in 1944-1945 was possible, because Eastern Europe
« had long ago been imagined,  discovered,  claimed and set  apart »13.  The  is  true,  of
course ;  however, the peculiarities of the Eastern pattern of development had already
existed for at least three centuries before the Enlightenment (tales about the cruelty of
barbarous rulers like Vlad the Impaler, or Ivan the Terrible, had propagated a repellent
image of the Eastern society only because the Western mind was already prepared to
accept it)14. At a time when historians indulge themselves in anatomies of “inventions”
and  “imagined  communities”,  another  attack  upon  the  present  identification  of  the
Balkans has come from Maria Todorova. She is ready to admit the objective existence of
this  geographic/cultural  unit,  but,  her  critique being directed against  the prejudiced
Western image,  this  is  indeed a passionate plea for the European integration of  this
region.  In  the  Balkan  identity  as  seen  by  Todorova,  the  decisive  component  is  the
Ottoman legacy. As such, her last word is to doubt that this originality will last15.
12 This brings us again to the variations undergone by the name of the region through the
medieval and modern centuries, keeping in mind that each one referred to a different
historical reality. As long as the basileia ton Rhomaion was alive, nobody, either inside, or
outside its frontiers, thought to separate the Balkan peninsula from the Empire. The rise
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of the Bulgarian and Serbian states did not have the significance of a secession : they were
simply competitors to the Byzantine Empire. Samuel or Dušan could never have been
what the nationalist  mythology has made of  them. As Robert Lee Wolff  was right to
argue : « to peoples starved of history, suddenly conscious of national identity, trying to
acquire  heroic  traditions,  the  deeds  of  princes  long  since  dead  assumed  enormous
importance »16. If ever conceived as a whole, the territory between Constantinople and
the Danube was identified with the core of the Empire, the Romania, a space which the
Turks called Roumeli,  while medieval Western travelers knew it as Romanie.  The same
expression is  familiar  to  the reader  of  Italian sources,  where it  meant  the maritime
possessions of Venice or even, in a broad sense, the Aegean basin, surrounded by the
shores of Asia Minor, Thrace, continental Greece and the Peloponnese. Though it is not
attested in contemporary texts, the most convenient designation for the Balkan Peninsula
from the 13th to the 15th century seems to be “Greek Christendom”. “Slavia Orthodoxa”
would suggest more about the ethnic character of the majority of the non-Moslems and
about the language of the manuscripts which survived in monastic libraries. These were,
however, translations, for the most part, and their original language was, unmistakably,
Greek. There was not a severance of contacts with the outside world, but in the relation
with the West, whether confrontational or collaborative, the nature of this society was
perceived as alien and usually associated with the Eastern Church, a generalization which
caused  a  lasting  distrust.  Meanwhile,  the  internal  situation  in  this  phase  was
characterized by an inexorable drive towards fragmentation. Less so in the Romanian
principalities, where, nevertheless, vague, indeed unformulated, rules of succession to
the  throne,  coupled  with  the  instability  of  borders,  lay  behind most  of  the  military
adventures  throughout  the  14th and 15 th centuries.  It  was  the  proximity  of  the  two,
relatively more consolidated, kingdoms of Hungary and Poland which precipitated the
concentration of power in Wallachia and Moldavia. An important observation which must
be added is that the blatant assertion of Christianity did not preclude the survival of
heresy and pagan beliefs (the number of extant charms, spells, incantations, and magical
prayers is surprisingly large, most of such texts being of quite recent date). This religious
confusion is almost general in the Balkans and bears the stamp of the complex, archaic,
Byzantine tradition17.
 
About the area’s originality
13 Our periodization cannot avoid the phase of Ottoman domination, with the historical
legacy it has left. Its main consequence is that Islam is there to stay, which does not mean
only the existence of scattered minorities (in Greece, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia
and Romania), but also to stay in the shape of the newly built state of Bosnia - a project
which does not seem more “unreasonable” than Bernard Newman’s idea, at the end of the
Second World War, to create a Jewish state in Bessarabia. Up until the turn of the 19th
century,  the  presence  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  achieved  in  our  region  a  single,
independent and virtually closed system. It is also the only epoch during which the name
of Balkan might have been appropriately applied. The interests which the economic and
political network between Constantinople and Hotin was intended to serve were those of
the Turkish military machinery. Without any exaggeration, we can say that the prolonged
wars - either against the sultan’s enemies, or fought inside the system - were the crucible
in which ethnic consciousness reached crystallization. This process progressed from the
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periphery to the centre. The first territorial communities which acquired a sense of their
historic identity were the Romanian principalities and then Serbia.  Greece was not a
borderland, but the first Greek subversive actions, though inspired by and from centres of
Hellenism which were in a peripheral position, did not aspire to a local independence :
they  envisaged  the  future  organization  of  a  space  no  less  multinational  than  the
Byzantine Empire had been. Rhigas stressed the unity of those speaking Greek - who was
not then fluent in that language, among the cultural, ecclesiastical and economic élites of
the Balkans ? Whereas the Great Church of Constantinople emphasized the unity of all
orthodox  Christians,  irrespective  of  their  mother  tongue,  the  only  criterion  for
differentiation to be acknowledged by the Turkish bureaucracy was that of status in the
hierarchy of the Ottoman state. Consciously or not, the Turks played one ethnic group
against the other, encouraging some divisions and conflicts which we now accept too
easily  as  spontaneous.  Even when they did  suppress  internal  strife  or  forced it  into
compromise,  they  did  so  in  order  to  maintain  the  military  order  and  the  state
organization. I wonder whether we should include the Ottoman period in this sequence of
historical  conditions which changed something in the definition of the region.  Oddly
enough,  it  would seem that only when it  became a thing of  the past,  did it  lend its
symbolic weight to our perception of the region. 
14 It was only Westernization which gave rise, together with national consciousness, to a
general sense of the region’s originality, lost until then in the network of bonds with the
imperial  capital.  Every nation started to idealize its own past,  as a compensation for
present frustration or as a promise of a great future. When the new states endeavoured to
construct  their  own administrations,  they tended to acquire privileged bureaucracies
which inherited from the Ottoman one strategies to eschew responsibility and to form
protégé networks. Later, every political party would develop its own clientèle system on
this model. Lacking cities of the Western medieval type, these countries maintained a
relationship between city and rural environment from which all the benefit was drawn by
the  urban  consumers.  The  orientalization  of  the  Balkans  under  Ottoman  rule  had
reinforced the  old  reaction of  seeing  there  a  medley  of  peoples  “half  Christian  half
Turkish”18. A long range of projects which prepared the partition of the Ottoman Empire -
or, at least, its mutilation - identified “Turkey in Europe” as a space to be colonized and
annexed by the Western powers19 :  a  way,  they already argued,  to return to Europe.
Whenever travellers from the “enlightened” West ventured to cross the Balkans, they
discovered what they expected to find : that is, a striking contrast with their own society.
The state of things they witnessed differed from the more familiar landscape of England
or France in two essential respects : the backwardness of economy and that lack of liberty
which  came  to  be  called  “despotism”20.  The  most  scholarly-minded  among  these
explorers were also in search of Greek and Roman ruins, and another contrast, that of a
venerable past with the humble present, was no less typical for this kind of literature.
15 Although the first description of the region under the name of Balkanhalbinsel, or in more
classical terms, Haemushalbinsel, dates from 1808, these designations at first had a merely
geographic meaning. Was it not Metternich who, at the same time, contested that Italy
might be more than a geographic expression ? It is surely significant that, in the Balkans
and in the Romanian lands, when somebody travelled westwards, he was said to be going
“inside”. The West was identified with the core, by the inhabitants of the outposts : the
position being essential  in this  system of  values,  it  was  already a  form of  idealizing
Western Europe21. As a result of their own experience, if they had the opportunity to visit
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it,  those who ascribed positive qualities to the West came to be conscious of the gap
existing between their own world and the superior civilization of the Enlightenment. The
same  providers  of  knowledge  were,  in  their  own  countries,  the  most  influential
propagators of modernization. They would not have thought of the Balkans as a unitary
structure, nor would they have expected the necessary reforms to be directed by the
Ottoman officialdom. Once they had conceived the mould of the nation-state, innovation
could come only through a bilateral contract between the nation and that West which
they represented as the sole custodian of all sciences and skills. Therefore the idea of a
confederation established around a Balkan or a Danubian nucleus was suggested only by
observers from outside, who dreamt of a solution to appease ethnic antagonism. Their
expectations could not be fulfilled, even in a lesser form - King Charles I of Romania was
to refuse the crown of Bulgaria in 188722 - and the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire
continued.
16 When the  name  of  “South-Eastern  Europe”  was  found,  it  was  once  again  a  German
geograher,  Theobald Fischer,  who was responsible  for  its  theoretical  elaboration and
popularization.  The  date  was  1893,  only  a  few  years before  that  other  catchword,
“Mitteleuropa”, became fashionable. The new concept expressed the striving towards a
larger unity, as it included Romania, at least the Old Kingdom. Two political connotations
can be grasped in the history of this notion of “Südost”. One is revealed by the goals of
Habsburg politics around 1908, at the time when the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina
marked a short-lived victory of the Triple Alliance in the Balkans. The truth is that the
1876 intervention of Austrian troops, which had opened the way for the latter move, had
been justified by the need to use force to impose a negotiated settlement after a brutal
outbreak of Moslem intolerance23. In the present circumstances, we can not blame this
attitude. The interest of Austrian and German scholars in the Balkans (Nopcsa, Weigand,
Jireček, Patsch, etc.) was increasing by the turn of the century and in 1911 a first centre
for the study of South-Eastern Europe emerged at the University of Vienna24. It aimed to
introduce  the  Balkan  nations  and  the  intricate  historic  connections  among  them to
diplomats who wrestled unsuccessfully with such problems. Their failure to assess events
correctly was quick to show and the war brought this activity to a premature end. The
second time around, Südosteuropa did not have any more luck. This was in the Thirties, in
an atmosphere charged with ideological passion. The political stimulus to consider this
“Raum” as  naturally  complementary  to  the  “Reich”  became more  pointed,  and Nazi
propaganda  had  begun  to  exert  a  perceptible,  though  veiled,  influence  within  the
structure of academic life in the Balkan countries as well as in Romania and Hungary25. In
the prospect of that united Europe which was offered by Hitler’s ambition, Südosteuropa
found a justification. And soon, one after another, the countries of the region concluded
alliances  with  the  Axis  or  were  occupied.  Hence  in  the  late  ‘40s  and early  ‘50s  this
compromised  term  was  difficult  to  accept,  also  because  the  Soviet  occupation  and
Communization had again divided the region in two camps, as it had been during the
revisionist campaigns, but on a different separation line.
17 A remarkable effort to introduce the name of South-Eastern Europe, with the advantage
of including Romania, was made in Bucharest following the end of the Balkan wars in
1913. It was not only a plea for the peaceful solution of international disagreements and
for the reciprocation of more understanding in the relations among the irascible Balkan
nations. What the Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga intended to do was to assert the
cultural unity of the Peninsula and to assure for his own country, by a rational approach,
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the allies  she  needed  when,  from  both  sides,  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary,  she  had
experienced the arrogance of imperialist politics. This independent initiative won some
support  in  Romania  from  the  intelligentsia,  Iorga  being  assisted by  two  younger
colleagues, the archaeologist V. Pârvan and the geographer and geologist G. M. Murgoci.
The creation of an Institute “pour l’étude de l’Europe sud-orientale” in 1914 contributed
substantially to the development of this interest, especially through the publication of a
“Bulletin”, to become, ten years later, the Revue historique du Sud-Est européen26. Before
Budimir and Skok issued in Belgrade their Revue internationale d’études balkaniques,  the
Romanian journal was the only one in the field, though gradually, reflecting the tireless
activity of Iorga, who was himself writing most of the articles and all  the reviews, it
adopted a broader scope, so that it covered the medieval and modern history of Western
Europe as well. As early as 1914, Iorga had published a history of the Balkan states (in
Romanian, of which there is also a French translation)27. Author of a classic work on the
Ottoman Empire28, he was now giving it a counterpart : after a survey of the life of the
subject peoples, most of the book described the contacts with Russians and Austrians, the
national  awakening and the  achievement  of  independence.  Although the  Romanians,
clinging to their distinctive Romance language, used to reject any suggestion that they
were  a  Balkan  people,  Iorga,  whose  political  doctrine  is  often  classified  as  being
chauvinist, emphasized their close relations with the South Danubian territories, their
religious allegiance to the oecumenical Patriarchate, the protection they granted to the
Balkan culture and later to the Balkan revolutionary emigration. The question was again
discussed in two later works,  Le caractère commun des institutions du Sud-est  de l’Europe
(1929), where Iorga’s scholarship was drawn to the historical sociology of the peasantry,
and Byzance après Byzance (1935),  which studied the survival of Byzantine tradition in
several autonomous enclaves.
18 To analyze in the light of modern theories and methods what historic experience the
Romanians share with their neighbours of the Balkan Peninsula has been the concern of
the scholars who are working in the Bucharest Institute since 1963, when it was revived
after a 15 years’ eclipse. When the late Nicolae Ceauşescu, in search of an independent
version of  Communism which would make his  regime popular,  started talking about
positive historical associations with the other South-East European nations, it was a way
of idealizing the attempts to defend Romanian freedom against  Russian,  Turkish and
Habsburg encroachments. This led gradually to an extreme nationalist discourse which
implied  isolationism,  thus  contradicting  the  very  purpose  for  which  these  regional
studies had been encouraged. Since 1990, a dialogue is freely engaged between those who
adopt, more or less openly, the same autistic view of Romania’s history and the rival
conception which would enlarge the notion of Romania, regarding this country as part of
one context, or another29.
 
Definitions’ and borders’ changes
19 The trouble is that, as always, the course of ideas is determined less by their own dynamic
force  than  by  external  pressure.  We  are  watching  a  new  shift  of  emphasis.  As  an
alternative both to “South-Eastern Europe” (too close to a grim image of the Balkans),
and  to  the  Soviet-dominated  “Eastern  Europe”,  “Central  Europe”  is  proving  a  more
fashionable definition, which already has the blessing of the U.S.  State Department. I
learnt from one of President Iliescu’s speeches that Romania is in Central Europe. Every
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time I have been talking with somebody holding office in the Romanian government or
diplomatic service, I was given the same disappointing answer : « we are not concerned
about South-Eastern Europe, we are in Central Europe, you know ».
20 No, I wasn’t aware. There is one feature of this situation which worries me. The term
“Central Europe” was not resuscitated (by Milan Kundera in 1984) for the purpose of
extending South-Eastern Europe to the West, but for that of distinguishing what was then
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary from the Eastern bloc and from the Balkans. The
Višegrad treaty, signed in an apt location near the picturesque ruins of a castle that had
been already, in the 14th century a meeting place for the three kings, and the recent
welcoming to NATO of the same three states (no mistake : Slovakia was a province of
medieval Hungary) successfully demontrated to us that Central Europe has this political
significance. When Naumann, in 1915, launched the idea of a space, placed between the
two empires then at war, Germany and Russia, which he considered adequate for German
and Austrian economic and cultural  hegemony,  it  did not include Romania,  Bulgaria,
Serbia and Greece. They are still left out in the shadows of the Balkan mountains. The
only exception is Greece, whose membership in both NATO and the EU is equivalent to
being an honorary Central European. But, then, one has the right to ask : what is left of
South-Eastern Europe ?30
21 One of the lessons of this argument is that not only the definitions change : the borders
also are liable to move. I could tell you the story of a friend of mine who was born in
Soviet Bessarabia at the end of 1940, lived for the first three years of her life in Romania
(without moving from her mostly Albanian village) and then, because her parents fled
west  in front  of  the Red Army,  found herself  in Romania -  same name,  but  another
country,  -  while  the  village  fell  within  Ukraine.  But  this  is  another  story.  A  more
challenging question is how a country may change location. If South-Eastern Europe did
not exist before the continent qualified as a historical unit, the principalities of Wallachia
and Moldavia,  though they belonged to the Ottoman Empire,  were not a part  of  the
Balkans. Their unification, which was one of the results of the Crimean War, marked the
day when a new nation was born. However, no sooner had the confiscation of monastic
properties been promulgated in 1863, in imitation of a similar reform enacted in Greece,
30 years before, than the country began to leave South-Eastern Europe. The quarrel with
the Constantinople Patriarchate and the decision to use in church only the Romanian
language were omens of a new orientation, which was confirmed by the declaration of
independence in 1877. Of the provinces acquired in 1918, Transylvania and Bukovina had
a strong Central European character, owing to the centuries of Habsburg administration.
From then on until 1940, the tradition which prevailed was the South-East European one.
Not  only  the  loss  of  Northern  Bukovina,  not  only  the  mass  emigration  of  the
Transylvanian Saxons, but the social ascension of a rural population whose values were
decidedly  of  Balkan  origin  have  been,  during  the  Communist  regime,  factors  which
accentuated the development of this tradition. There is, nevertheless, the question of the
future path to be taken by Romania. The contacts, suddenly revived with Turkey and
Greece,  and,  quite recently,  the sympathy shown by the Romanian press for Serbia’s
plight, are valid reasons to think that Romania’s aspiration to join Western Europe will
coexist many years ahead with those elements of her historic inheritance - Byzantine,
Ottoman, 19th-century liberal and populist - which attach her to South-Eastern Europe.
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